Choragos runs AI coding agents as regular child processes of your user, the
same way you would run claude or aider from a shell. It is not a sandbox
and does not claim to be one.
What Choragos provides:
- Least privilege per role, environment only.
env_allow/env_denyfilter the environment a role's process receives, so a reviewer never gets yourAWS_*credentials in its env. This is process-env hygiene, not isolation. - Approval gates. Human (
approve) and machine (judge) gates hold a delegation before it reaches a role, and any judge ambiguity falls closed to a human gate. - Checkpoints. Agent file changes are checkpointed with git plumbing and can be rolled back without touching history.
- Gateway in the LLM path (optional). With Sphragis enabled, each worker is launched with its LLM base URL pointed at the local gateway for PII redaction and a tamper-evident audit log, and delegation is refused while the gateway is down.
What Choragos explicitly does not prevent:
- An agent reading any file your user can read (
~/.ssh, dotfiles, repository secrets, local config). - An agent reaching the network directly (cloud instance metadata, arbitrary
endpoints).
ANTHROPIC_BASE_URLroutes cooperating clients through the gateway; it is not egress enforcement. - An agent executing any binary your user can execute.
OS-level isolation belongs to the OS. A role's command is arbitrary, so it
can be a wrapper such as docker run, sandbox-exec, or bwrap, and the
whole deck can run inside a container or VM. Choragos composes with those
layers instead of reimplementing them; working setups are collected in
docs/sandboxing.md.
Please report security vulnerabilities privately. Do not open a public issue for a suspected vulnerability.
- Preferred: open a private GitHub Security Advisory.
- Alternatively, email nonicked@protonmail.com with the details.
Please include:
- A description of the issue and its impact.
- Steps to reproduce, or a proof of concept.
- Affected version or commit.
- Any suggested remediation, if you have one.
You will receive an acknowledgement within 5 business days. We will keep you informed as we investigate, agree a disclosure timeline, and ship a fix. We aim to triage within 10 business days and to credit reporters who wish to be named.
Release archives are built by GitHub Actions and signed keyless with cosign; build provenance is attested with GitHub artifact attestations.
# 1. verify the signed checksums file (cosign v2+)
cosign verify-blob \
--bundle checksums.txt.bundle \
--certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/sphragis-oss/choragos/\.github/workflows/release\.yml@.*' \
--certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \
checksums.txt
# 2. verify the archive against the checksums
shasum -a 256 --check --ignore-missing checksums.txt
# 3. verify build provenance (GitHub CLI)
gh attestation verify choragos_darwin_arm64.tar.gz --repo sphragis-oss/choragosSBOMs (Syft) for every archive are attached to each release.
Choragos is pre-1.0. Until a stable release line exists, only the latest released version receives security fixes.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| latest release | yes |
| older | no |
Choragos is a self-hosted multi-agent orchestrator TUI that runs locally. The most security-relevant areas are:
- PTY bounds and input handling (preventing arbitrary command execution escapes).
- IPC socket permissions and hijacking.
- Configuration loading and unauthenticated local execution.
Reports in these areas are especially valued.