[spark-compete] fix(security): validate targetFolder in PRD bridge write to prevent path traversal - #862
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- Validate targetFolder in PRD bridge write stays within the workspace root before writing, rejecting traversal outside cwd (vibeforge1111#862) - Validate workingDirectory in the dispatch endpoint against the Spark workspace root so spawned processes cannot run with an arbitrary cwd (vibeforge1111#861) - Reject interpreter code-execution flags in creator-mission validation commands, and validate missionId format against path traversal (vibeforge1111#869). Completed the flag denylist per review: added node -p/--print and python -m/--module alongside the original -c/--command/-e/--eval/-. vibeforge1111#860 (teams endpoint auth) is already satisfied by a superior requireTeamsAuth implementation on the base branch — no change landed. harness_core interim_until_migration for the creator-mission validation path: re-home into Governor on migration. Co-authored-by: ifeoluwaaj <ifeoluwaaj@users.noreply.github.com> Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ath traversal Add path containment validation in extractTargetFolder to ensure the target path stays within the allowed workspace (process.cwd()). Without this check, an attacker-supplied PRD containing an absolute path like /etc/shadow could trick the write endpoint into writing files outside the workspace directory. - Add isPathWithinWorkspace() helper that resolves and prefix-checks paths - Modify extractTargetFolder() to validate and reject out-of-workspace paths - Log a warning when a path traversal attempt is rejected - Import resolve from 'path' for proper path resolution
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The simplified isPathWithinWorkspace only checked against process.cwd(), breaking tests that use SPAWNER_STATE_DIR under /tmp. Restored: - canonicalize() for cross-platform symlink resolution - isForeignOsAbsolutePath() for cross-OS path handling - isPathWithinWorkspace() checks against sparkWorkspaceRoot and spawnerStateDir, and respects SPARK_ALLOW_EXTERNAL_PROJECT_PATHS - extractTargetFolder() skips workspace check for foreign OS paths This restores the security fix while maintaining test compatibility.
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spark-compete Packet
"evidence.forbidden": [
"no hardcoded secrets or credentials",
"no eval() or exec() calls",
"no shell injection vectors",
"no unsafe deserialization",
"no path traversal in new code",
"no network calls added"
]
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fix: resolve issue in vibeship-spawner-ui
Severity: MEDIUM
Expected:
Root Cause
The bug was identified through code review. See PR diff for specific details.
Team: Sequence
Before (The Bug)
After (The Fix)
Testing
fix(security): validate targetFolder in PRD bridge write to prevent path traversalFiles Changed
src/routes/api/prd-bridge/write/+server.tscanonicalize(),isPathWithinWorkspace(),isForeignOsAbsolutePath(), andextractTargetFolder()functions that documented internal path validation logicsrc/routes/api/prd-bridge/write/+server.ts(line 9)src/routes/api/prd-bridge/write/+server.ts(line 416)Risk Notes
Duplicate Notes