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security: audit hardening wave 1 — IDOR binding, XFF spoof, SVG-XSS, unauth abuse - #248
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…unauth abuse From an 8-lens multi-agent security audit (full findings in docs/SECURITY_AUDIT.md). This wave closes the confirmed, high-severity, non-breaking issues; the systemic auth-enforcement flip is documented as the one operator step that needs frontend signing. - require-auth: add requireWalletMatch(auth, actingWallet) to bind the proven signer to the wallet a request mutates (closes the systemic IDOR where requireAuth proved control of x-wallet but routes acted on a body-supplied wallet). No-op while AUTH_ENFORCED is off, so the binding is correct the instant the flag flips. Added a loud production warning when AUTH_ENFORCED is not 'true'. - rateLimit ipFromRequest: stop trusting the spoofable LEFTMOST X-Forwarded-For (an attacker rotated it to defeat per-IP limits). Prefer Vercel's x-real-ip / x-vercel-forwarded-for, else the rightmost XFF hop. - profile avatar: add auth + requireWalletMatch (was unauthenticated IDOR); reject SVG/non-raster data URLs (stored-XSS via data:image/svg+xml). - generate/image, delivery/upload, a2a: add per-IP rate limiting (were unauthenticated + unthrottled: fal.ai bill abuse, Blob cost abuse, job spam). - agents/stake, agents/unstake, profile POST, profile/[wallet] PATCH: add requireAuth + requireWalletMatch (were spoofable / unauthenticated IDOR on stake/slash/identity). Deferred to follow-up (tracked in docs/SECURITY_AUDIT.md): SSRF TOCTOU/DNS-rebinding in agent register, x402 facilitator mint/recipient re-check, off-chain dispute griefing, wallet-signature replay nonce cache, reputation self-dealing, and the AUTH_ENFORCED=true production flip (needs frontend/SDK request signing).
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From an 8-lens multi-agent security audit (on-chain, authz, payments, injection/SSRF, crypto, DoS, business-logic, web-hardening). Full findings:
docs/SECURITY_AUDIT.md(64 raw findings). This wave closes the confirmed high-severity, non-breaking issues; each was triaged by hand against the actual code.Fixed
requireAuthproved control ofx-walletbut routes then acted on a body/path-supplied wallet without binding. NewrequireWalletMatch(auth, actingWallet)enforces signer == target; wired into avatar, stake, unstake, profile POST, profile PATCH. No-op whileAUTH_ENFORCEDis off, so it's correct the instant the flag flips.ipFromRequestused the attacker-controllable leftmost XFF. Now prefers Vercel'sx-real-ip/x-vercel-forwarded-for, else the rightmost hop.data:image/svg+xml(active content).generate/image(paid fal.ai),delivery/upload(Blob cost),a2a(job spam) now per-IP rate limited.true.Deferred (tracked in
docs/SECURITY_AUDIT.md)SSRF TOCTOU/DNS-rebinding (agent register), x402 facilitator mint/recipient re-check, off-chain dispute griefing, wallet-signature replay nonce cache, reputation self-dealing, and the AUTH_ENFORCED=true production flip — that one needs the frontend + SDK to sign requests, a product step, not a code-only change.
Related: C-090/C-091/C-092/C-093 (M6 security).