fix(ai): explicit allow-list for ask-loop approval (refactor-safety)

secator/ai/actions.py

@@ -171,6 +171,13 @@ def _build_action_display(action: Dict) -> str:
 	return ""
 
 
+def _is_approved(response) -> bool:
+	# Explicit allow-list: only a normalized "allow" answer approves. None, "deny",
+	# or any unexpected token denies (fail closed) — so a new backend or a refactored
+	# answer vocabulary can't silently approve via a "not deny" gap.
+	return bool(response) and response.get("answer") == "allow"
+
+
 def check_guardrails_sync(action: Dict, ctx: ActionContext) -> Tuple[Optional[str], List]:
 	"""Non-generator wrapper for check_guardrails.
 
@@ -255,7 +262,7 @@ def check_guardrails(action: Dict, ctx: ActionContext):
 			if is_remote:
 				yield ctx.backend.build_pending_prompt(**ask_kwargs)
 			response = ctx.backend.ask_user(**ask_kwargs) if ctx.backend else None
-			if response is None or response.get("answer") == "deny":
+			if not _is_approved(response):
 				return "Action denied: shell command not approved"
 			if parse_failed:
 				return None
@@ -279,7 +286,7 @@ def check_guardrails(action: Dict, ctx: ActionContext):
 			if is_remote:
 				yield ctx.backend.build_pending_prompt(**ask_kwargs)
 			response = ctx.backend.ask_user(**ask_kwargs) if ctx.backend else None
-			if response is None or response.get("answer") == "deny":
+			if not _is_approved(response):
 				return f"Action denied: target {target} not approved"
 
 		# Handle path prompts
@@ -302,7 +309,7 @@ def check_guardrails(action: Dict, ctx: ActionContext):
 				if is_remote:
 					yield ctx.backend.build_pending_prompt(**ask_kwargs)
 				response = ctx.backend.ask_user(**ask_kwargs) if ctx.backend else None
-				if response is None or response.get("answer") == "deny":
+				if not _is_approved(response):
 					return f"Action denied: {access_type} access to {path} not approved"
 
 		# Re-check to see if more layers need prompting

tests/unit/test_ai_actions.py

@@ -1129,6 +1129,38 @@ def test_unresolved_after_max_rounds_denies(self):
 		self.assertIn("unresolved", denial)
 
 
+class TestApprovalAllowList(unittest.TestCase):
+	"""Ask-loop approval must be an explicit allow-list: only "allow" proceeds."""
+
+	def _run(self, answer):
+		from secator.ai.actions import check_guardrails_sync
+		ask = MagicMock(decision="ask", shell_command="somecmd", targets=[], paths=[], reason="needs approval")
+		allow = MagicMock(decision="allow", shell_command="", targets=[], paths=[], reason="")
+		engine = MagicMock()
+		engine.check_action.side_effect = [ask, allow]
+		backend = MagicMock()
+		backend.ask_user.return_value = None if answer is None else {"answer": answer}
+		ctx = ActionContext(targets=['t.com'], model='m')
+		ctx.permission_engine = engine
+		ctx.backend = backend
+		denial, _items = check_guardrails_sync({"action": "shell", "command": "somecmd"}, ctx)
+		return denial
+
+	def test_allow_proceeds(self):
+		self.assertIsNone(self._run("allow"))
+
+	def test_deny_denies(self):
+		self.assertIsNotNone(self._run("deny"))
+
+	def test_unexpected_answer_denies(self):
+		# an out-of-vocabulary token must NOT be treated as approval (fail closed)
+		self.assertIsNotNone(self._run("sure"))
+		self.assertIsNotNone(self._run("allow_all_typo"))
+
+	def test_none_response_denies(self):
+		self.assertIsNotNone(self._run(None))
+
+
 @unittest.skipUnless(ADDONS_ENABLED['ai'], 'ai addon not installed')
 class TestSubagentFanoutCap(unittest.TestCase):
 	"""H4: recursion depth + per-turn fan-out caps on AI-subagent spawns."""