goldstein keohane

In der Einleitung zu ihrem Sammelband grenzen Goldstein und Keohane ihren Ansatz von Rationalismus, „reflectivism“ und Spieltheorie ab. Laut Goldstein und Keohane gibt es drei Arten von Ideen, die sich in Komplexität und Generalität unterscheiden: world views, principled beliefs und causal beliefs. Diese können jeweils auf drei verschiedene Weisen Einfluss nehmen. Sie ordnen die empirischen Kapitel des Buchs sowie weitere empirische Forschung in dieses Schema ein.

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Goldstein, J., & Keohane, R. O. (1993). Ideas and Foreign Policy - An Analytical Framework. In J. Goldstein & R. O. Keohane (Eds.), Ideas and Foreign Policy - Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

• ideas = beliefs held by individuals
• ideas = "influence policy when
  • the principled or causal beliefs they embody provide road maps that increase actors' clarity about goals or ends-means relationships
  • when they affect outcomes of strategic situations in which there is no unique equilibrium
  • and when they become embedded in political institutions" (3)
• "ideas as well as interests have causal weight in explanations of human action" (4)
• opposed to: ideas are unimportant, epiphenomenal "because agents correctly anticipate the results of their actions or because some selective process ensures that only agents who behave as if they were rational succeed" (4) some kind of natural selection is in place.
• "But even if we accept the rationality premise, actions taken by human beings depend on the substantive quality of ideas, since such ideas help to clarify principles and conceptions of causal relationships, and to coordinate individual behavior. Once institutionalized, furthermore, ideas continue to guide action in the absence of costly innovation." (5)
• On Reflectivism: (similar to constructivism, symbolic interactionism)
  • "beliefs are a central element of all research because (...) analysis turns on how 'knowledgable practices constitute subjects'. Reflectivists 'share a cognitive, intersubjective conception of process in which identities and interests are endogenous to interaction, rather than a rationalist-behavioral one in which they are exogenous.'" (5)
  • "This explains how preferences are formed and how identities are shaped"
    • Bingo! This is the exact place of pluralism vs. deliberative fora on tax. This is the kind of process I'm looking at.
  • "Reflectivist students of the impact of ideas on policy often argue that interests cannot be conceptualized apart from ideas that constitute them, and that it is therefore futile to try to distinguish interests and ideas analytically, as we seek to do. Adopting such a view, however, would foreclose the possibility of evaluating the hypothesis that ideas are hooks against our argument that they often exert a major impact on policy." (26)
• Three Types of Beliefs
  • World Views
    • "conceptions of possibility" (8)
    • "the connections between world views and shifts in material power and interests are complex and need investigation" (8)
  • Principled Beliefs
    • right from from, just from unjust (9)
    • "mediate between world views and particular policy conclusions; they translate fundamental doctrines into guidance for contemporary human action." (9)
  • Causal Beliefs
    • "... about cause-effect relationships which derive authority from the shared consensus of recognized elites, whether they be village elders or scientists at elite institutions" (10)
• The Impact of Ideas on Policy
  • there is no clear-cut causal connection between ideas held by policy makers and policy choices. (11)
  • It's not about inherent quallity, it's about "choices of specific ideas may simply reflect the interests of actors"
  • Weber as cited in ibid. "Not ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govern men's conduct. Yet very frequently the 'world images' that have been created by these ideas have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest" (12)
  • "We do not suggest a theory for the creation of these switches, or even a fully worked-out model to explain the process by which ideas are selected." (12)
  • Three Pathways:
    • ideas serve as road maps
      • "... derives from the need of individuals to determine their own preferences or to understand the causal relationship between their goals and alternative strategies by which to reach those goals." (12)
      • "If actors do not know with certainty the consequences of their actions, it is the expected effects of actions that explain them. And under conditions of uncertainty, expectations depend on causal beliefs as well as on institutional arrangements for authoritative decision making." (13)
      • "In sum, when we view politics as an arena in which actors face continual uncertainties about their interests and how to maximize them, the need for ideas to act as road maps becomes apparent. Ideas serve the purpose of guiding behavior under conditions of uncertainty by stipulating causal patterns or by providing compelling ethical or moral motivations for action." (16)
    • ideas contribute to outcomes in the absence of a unique equilibrium
      • "they may serve as focal points that define cooperative solutions or act as coalitional glue to facilitate the cohesion of particular groups - which may even prevent agreement on a wider basis.
    • ideas embedded in institutions specify policy in the absence of innovation
      • "thus, from a game-theoretic perspective, ideas may be important precisely because unique predictions cannot be generated solely through an examination of interests and strategic interactions (utility functions and payoff matrices). Because almost all games with repeated play have multiple equilibria, the ideas held by players are often the key to a game's outcome" (17)
      • "in general, when institutions intervene, the impact of ideas may be prolonged for decades or even generations. In this sense, ideas can have an impact even when no one genuinely believes in them as principled or causal statements." (20)
      • • Bingo for Tax! Think Income tax!
      • "Although this institutionalization may reflect the power of some idea, its existence may also reflect the interests of the powerful" (21)
        • Bingo for Tax! Think income tax! PathwayWorld ViewsPrincipled BeliefsCausal BeliefsNeed for road mapsJackson: rapid decolonization, based on notions of autonomy, democracy, equality. No more: empirical requirements (civilization, etc.). Sikkink: Human rights after WW II, different reactions in Europe (domestic) and US (foreign) policy.Ikenberry: Post-WW II US policy (Keynesian demand management) was decided by epistemic communities Halpern: Stalinist political economy adopted by non-soviet statesAbsence of unique equilibriaFerejohn: sovereign king vs. sovereign parliamentGarrett/Weingast: moving to the internal market to achieve cooperative liberalization by means of "mutucal recognition / Cassis de Dijon"Garrett/Weingast (ctd.)Institutional persistenceKrasner: Sovereignty predated Westphalia and was "institutionalized" ex-post.Katzenstein: institutional norms in Japan and Germany reflect different principled beliefs (Grotian vs. Hobesian), leading to persistingly different reactions to terrorismKatzenstein (ctd.)
• Research Design:
  • H0: "variation in policy across countries, or over time, is entirely accounted for by changes in factors other than ideas." (6)
  • "We do not seek to explain the sources of these ideas; we focus on their effects" (7)
• Note:
  • this is still methodological individualism
  • how is this not complete relativism?
  • Note the link to my PhD proposal
  • on the text, as well as on the seminar: It's a little sad that this is set in the lofty arena of IR, with no explication let alone theorizing of its (micro-?)sociological genesis. What's lacking is an application of this framework to the underbelly of the social world. By the underbelly, I mean the realms of (state) power (monopoly on the use of violence) and (social) inequality (property rights and scale-free distributions).
  • Ignoring the social (!) and cognitive psychology of ideational genesis is an equally big question. To understand "equilibria" (meaning in complex systems, not necessarily in games of individuals, maybe by 'natural selection'?) of ideas, their genesis and their persistence would be key. Without it, this is not a theory of social change.
    • maybe in particular the "principled beliefs" are lacking a theory of social change. Evolutionary anthropology, for instance (Wilkinson/Pickett) has something to offer in this regard.
  • I'm not happy about the relativism in here. You've gotta think about what's the right idea, and how ideas (ill-)serve life chances. What's the moral justification of this research?
  • Cite the research on the link between deciding and emotions. It's about the emotions, so why are they lacking?
  • Hypothesis: is there a chance that world views, principled beliefs have both collapsed, or are usurped by causal beliefs?
  • How do you become a "recognized elite" (10)? How does that social production of power happen?
  • No theory for creation of switches, or why ideas are selected. So what do you explain?
  • I am not convinced that the reflectivist critique (interests and ideas cannot be conceptualized apart) can be ignored.

PhD-thesis: If you look at the status quo of tax, it's screwed up and it is inconsistent with the (re)distributive goals that most people will subscribe to (survey results are difficult, though). It is also, and this is key, in violation of what seems to be a (Kaldor-Hicks-improved) habitat for the human species. So the question is, why? Maybe, one could argue (that's the H0 at the broadest level), because in a liberal democracy, (the prescriptive baseline for anything) you'll always end up here. We have this system, because it is the preferred of several imperfect ones. Or maybe (H1), it's not inevitable. Maybe, it depends on the political process. Cite the literature on emotions and deciding. Also: emotions and solidarity. Get the emotions into my PhD project.

Follow-up [ ] get Peter Haas "epistemic communities"' [ ] copy some parts to thesis notes [ ] copy some parts to Offe/Europe and Mildner/Crisis piece.

• in particular "epistemic communities" (14) on Keynesian demand management, later other stuff (World Bank, pension reform, etc.)